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BAR BRIEFS
In People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531 at 538. The
Court after citing the cases of Eley v. Miller, and People v. Alfani,
(supra) and many other cases said:
"The essential element underlying the relation of attorney and
client is that of trust and confidence of the highest degree growing out
of the employment and entering into the performance of every duty
which the attorney owes to his client in the course of such employment.
"The essential relation of trust and confidence between attorney
and client cannot be said to arise where the attorney is employed, not
by the client, but by some corporation which has undertaken to furnish
its members with legal advice, counsel and professional services. The
attorney in such a case owes his first allegiance to his immediate em-
ployer, the corporation, and owes, at most, but an incidental, secondary
and divided loyalty to the clientele of the corporation." (Italics ours.)
In People v. California Protective Corporation, 76 Cal. App. 354, at
364, the Court said:
"It is argued that under its articles of incorporation, a franchise
to practice law was 'granted' appellant by the state, and that, the fran-
chise having thus been 'dranted,' appellant should be allowed to exercise
it 'without being subjected to fine for doing so'. While it is true that
appellant usurped, or unlawfully exercised, the privilege or franchise
of practicing law, it is not true that such privilege or franchise was
'granted' to it. The practice of law by a corporation is, as we have
seen, unlawful. The statute did not authorize appellant's incorpora-
tors to call it into being for an unlawful purpose." (Italics ours.)
AUTO INSURANCE AGAIN
Notwithstanding the action of the State Bar Association expressing
the view that licensing, rather than insurance, would best serve our
needs so far as motor vehicle accidents are concerned, there is consider-
able amount of discussion elsewhere in favor of insurance.
Mr. J. Philip Bird, President of the New Jersey Manufacturers'
Association, is quite active along this line. We quote from a recent
statement:
"The insurance policy should insure everyone riding the particular
automobile which is covered, be he riding as owner, as chauffeur, as
business associate or as guest. The policy should insure also any other
person upon the public street, or highway, except the owner, chauffeur,
business associate or guest, riding in the other automobile.
"Those in the other automobile are protected by the insurance
which the owner of that automobile has furnished, and, therefore,
should not receive protection from the policy procured by the owner
of the first automobile.... The law making these changes should pro-
vide a schedule similar to the schedule contained in the Workmen's
Compensation Laws which would fix a definite amount to be paid for
certain injuries. This schedule.., would not depend upon the income
or earnings of the person injured. It would be a minimum schedule
in this sense that there would be nothing in the law to prevent an auto-
mobile owner from procuring a policy containing a higher schedule
than the'law requires.
"However, if the owner procures a schedule higher than the law
requires, reading in favor of himself, or his chauffeur, or the guests in
his car, it should be unlawful for the insurance company to give that
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higher schedule in regard to any of the persons whom I have last
named, without at the same time increasing the schedules by like
amounts to every person covered by the policy.
"No man should be allowed to use the public highway and pro-
vide high protection for himself and his friends, or for himself alone,
unless he is willing to provide the same degree of protection for strang-
ers who may be injured by his automobile. Furthermore, he should
not be allowed to take his automobile on the highway unless he fur-
nishes a minimum protection for every one whom it may injure except,
perhaps, himself."
Under Mr. Bird's proposal all automobiles with foreign license
plates would be subject to the law of his state, New Jersey.
REVIEW OF DECISIONS
Pearce vs. Hanlon et als: Plaintiff, a messenger, using motor-
cycle side car, while in performance of regular duties, was struck by
truck of defendants, while such truck was passing another car on the
street. The evidence was rather conflicting, hence, the most important
part of the final decision deals with the examination of witnesses by
the trial Court. HELD: The practice of trial Judges in asking ques-
tions "fairly calculated to elicit the facts and to make the testimony
more definite" is not to be condemned, following State vs. Hazlett, 14
N. D. 490,105 N. W. 617.
Baird, Receiver vs. Keitztnan et als: Note given by K. to M.
Bank was transferred to B. Bank, which became insolvent. Defense
was that note was without consideration, given to M. Bank as a tempo-
rary replacement and held as security while other notes were being col-
lected, collection to be made by one of the defendants. The offer of
proof was rejected, and judgment entered. HELD: Sufficient con-
sideration is shown in the detriment suffered by M. Bank in the release
of notes for collection. The Court quotes 5 Wigmore on Evidence,
2445, "An extrinsic agreement not to transfer an instrument payable
'to order' cannot be effective; for the term 'to order' imports negotia-
bility, and there is no purpose which the term could serve if that ele-
ment were discarded." Re the contention that this was a conditional
delivery: If a delivery is a conditional delivery at all when it is to be-
come effectual upon successful efforts to collect the amount from
others, "such a condition cannot be shown for the same reason that no
other agreement not embraced in the writing and qualifying that which
is embraced therein can be shown. Obviously, if it were possible for
one party to a contract, delivered for the purpose of taking effect, to
establish an agreement outside the writing that upon the happening of a
contingency the written terms of an obligation, absolute in form, were
to-be of no effect, the so-called parol evidence rule would lose much of
its value. There is as much reason why such a condition subsequent,
to be effective, should be contained in the writing as there is for re-
quiring to be incorporated therein agreements or understandings quali-
fying the written obligations in other respects."
SUPREME COURT WRITES "FINIS" IN HANSON CASE
The most controversial embranglement ever to exercise a disturb-
ing influence over the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
has been disposed of for the second time by the Supreme Court, and,
every one ever connected with it hopes, "finally".
